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Introduction
The relationship among society, physicians and pharmaceutical companies is complex and interactive. 
Pharmaceutical companies develop, manufacture and distribute powerful prescription drugs that benefit patients. 
However, while the pharmaceutical industry’s effort to encourage physicians to prescribe the right drug for 
the right patient at the right time in the right dose via the right route of administration (“The Five Rights”) 
can certainly be seen as contributing to the health of society (Blumenthal 2004), the marketing of prescription 
pharmaceuticals by for-profit firms could conceivably lead to unfortunate consequences; i.e., higher drug costs 
(Caudill et al 1996, Minnigan & Chisholm 2006), and the over/under use or even misuse of drugs in ways that 
might adversely affect patients (Relman & Angell 2002)
Many physicians have a positive attitude toward their interactions with pharmaceutical companies (Wazana 2000), 
professing to believe that their interactions with pharmaceutical companies provide educational value for both 
themselves and their patients, because the interactions allow the doctors to become aware of new prescription 
drugs and because the free samples provided by the pharmaceutical companies can be provided to patients (Chren 
1999, Brett, Burr & Moloo 2003). Many believe that they are entitled to such gifts, merely because of their 
profession (Minnigan & Chisholm, Sierles et al 2005).
Studies of Physician Behavior
In recent years, the attitudes of physicians (often non-practitioners, such as residents, Program Directors or 
medical students) regarding pharmaceutical companies’ gifts and interactions between pharmaceutical companies’ 
representatives and doctors have been examined extensively (Gibbons et al 1998, Poirier, Giannetti & Guidici 1994, 
Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee 2001). Many physician respondents are confident that any bias in the educational 
content or other offerings associated with pharmaceutical companies would not affect their own decision-making 
(Dana & Loewenstein 2003, Donnell et al 2009, Hodges 1995, Spithoff 2014, Steinman, Shliplak & McPhee, 
Wazana), but have doubts regarding how their peers might be influenced (Halperin, Hutchison & Barrier 2004, 
McKinney et al 1990, Sierles et al, Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee).  This includes medical students, practicing 
physicians and physicians in training. For example, in a study (Sierles et al) of medical students’ attitudes toward 
gift-giving by pharmaceutical companies, 69% believed that gifts would not influence how they practiced, but 
only 58% believed that gifts from pharmaceutical companies would not affect colleagues’ practices. Interestingly, 
another study (Palmisano & Edelstein 1980) of medical students’ attitudes toward gifts noted that while 85% of 
medical students felt that it would be improper for politicians to accept gifts, only 46% believed that it would be 
improper for them to accept a gift of equivalent value themselves.
Steinman, Shlipak & McPhee found that 61% of residents believed that they would not be influenced by 
pharmaceutical companies’ marketing efforts, although only 16% were felt the same about their colleagues. 
Brett, Burr & Moloo found that most respondents viewed a wide variety of interactions between doctors and drug 
companies (e.g., free pens, expensive textbooks, free drug samples, free lunches) would be ethically acceptable. 
Respondents were more likely to express concerns about interactions and pharmaceutical companies’ gifts as 
their value increased, when the situation involved recreational as opposed to professional activities, and when 
information provided to physicians during the interaction was perceived as biased or self-serving. Hodges 
examined the attitudes of psychiatric residents, and found that, while fewer than one third felt that pharmaceutical 
representatives were an accurate source of information about drugs, the vast majority surveyed (71%) did not 
wish these representatives banned from making presentations and 56% believed that receiving gifts would not 
affect their own prescribing behavior.  
In a study of practicing radiation oncologists, Halperin, Hutchison & Barrier found that while only 5% of 
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participants agreed with the statement “my prescribing practices are affected” by gifts, 33% agreed with the 
statement “I believe that other physicians prescribing practices are affected.” In the same study, the hypothesis 
that physicians believe that their conduct is less affected than those of their colleagues (i.e., “I am not influenced 
by gifts but someone else is”) was very strongly supported (p < 0.0001).
Clearly, a widespread view among physicians and physicians in training is that their professional training somehow 
differentiates them from non-physicians, making them resistant to influences that might be expected to affect other 
humans and enabling them to appraise their patients’ interests objectively and put those interests before all other 
considerations (Fischer et al. 2009, Donnell et al, Bihlmeyer, Schreiber & Farrand 2008, Halperin, Hutchison & 
Barrier, Sierles et al). Unfortunately, the data often does not support this view (Rawlins 1984).  For example, a 
recent study (Yeh 2016) examined the prescribing practices of 2444 physicians in the Massachusetts’ Medicare 
prescribing database. Seventy one percent had accepted pharmaceutical company sponsored meals. Physicians 
who had accepted no pharmaceutical company gifts prescribed brand name statins at a significantly lower rate 
(17.8%) than those who had received such gifts (22.8%). For every $1000 in pharmaceutical company gifts 
received, the rate of prescribing brand name statins increased 0.1% (p<0.001). This large scale study supports 
the conclusions of previous studies using small samples (Orlowski & Wateska 1992), and self-reported data 
(Bowman & Pearle 1988), as well as a widely regarded (Katz, Caplan & Mertz 2010) comprehensive review of 
the literature (Wazana). 
What Do the Pharmaceutical Companies Say and What Is Said About Them?
A representative of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA, the industry trade 
association) expressed the position of the organization regarding pharmaceutical marketing generally in the 
Journal of Internal Medicine: 
“Although not all drugs are breakthroughs, the … assumption that therapies already on the market 
should not be promoted is troubling for two reasons. First, it assumes that every new physician 
graduates from medical school with full knowledge about every drug on the market. Second, it 
ignores the fact that scientists often discover new benefits as well as risks in existing drugs.
… there is a need for responsible dissemination of information about drugs to physicians. 
Pharmaceutical companies know the most about their products, particularly new products. Hence 
they are the most knowledgeable source of information about these drugs. Without distribution 
of information by pharmaceutical companies, the diffusion of information about new medicines 
would take much longer and patients would be deprived of state-of-the art care (Beary 1996, p. 
635).” 
Later, Bert Spilker, a senior vice president of scientific and regulatory affairs at PhRMA expressed the industry’s 
position regarding pharmaceutical marketing and physicians specifically even more clearly: 
“[Critics of detailing] fear that physicians are so weak lacking in integrity that they would ‘sell 
their souls’ for a pack of M&M candies and a few sandwiches and donuts … certainly the vast 
majority of physicians are able to resist this temptations (sic) and make decisions solely based 
on the best medical interests of their patients” (Spilker 2002, p. 243).
Interestingly, despite these industry protestations that gifts would not be expected to influence physicians 
(Grant & Iserson 2005), Bardes (2005), in an article tellingly entitled “An Insider‘s Perspective: Defense of 
the Pharmaceutical Industry‘s Marketing Practices,” noted that pharmaceutical representatives “tend to be 
one sided” in their presentations to physicians. Many studies (Wazana 2000, Cho & Bero 1996, Stryer & Bero 
1996) characterize at least some of the information provided by pharmaceutical representatives as inaccurate, 
misleading, or biased and usually favoring the representative’s drug over similar offerings by other companies.  
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There are several inherent problems with the pharmaceutical companies’ position.  First, pharmaceutical companies’ 
gifts are, in fact, not truly gifts at all. In the U.S., to qualify as charitable gifts, the goods in question must exhibit 
a “detached and disinterested generosity” in order to be tax deductible (Commissioner v. Duberstein 363 U.S. 
733 [1949], cited in Katz, Caplan & Merz 2003, p. 14). Big pharma’s “gifts” are, in fact, clearly identified by the 
companies as marketing expenses, not charitable gifts, and are therefore not, in fact, tax deductible. “[C]alling 
small tokens given as part of the sales activity of pharmaceutical firms ‘gifts’ is disingenuous and a transparent 
attempt to be nonjudgmental. These ‘gifts’ should be recognized for what they are: marketing wares” (Katz, 
Caplan & Merz 2003, p. 14). Second, major pharmaceutical companies (e.g., Merck, Lilly) have policies which 
forbid their employees from accepting gifts or limit the size of gifts to a minimal value (i.e., no more than $5 or 
$10) (Grant & Iserson). A manager at Eli Lilly commented that “we want to keep things straight, aboveboard, 
business” (Randall 1991, p. 443). This manager, and by implication, his company, clearly understands that the 
acceptance of gifts, even small ones, has the potential to distort the behavior of the recipient, perhaps to the 
detriment of the company employing the gift recipient. Finally, even the U.S. Senate Finance Committee in 
2007 (Spithoff 2014, p. 694) has recognized the inherent conflict between pharmaceutical companies’ expressed 
rationale for gift giving to physicians and their business interests: “… it seems unlikely that this sophisticated 
industry would spend such large sums on an enterprise but for the expectation that the expenditures would 
be recouped by increased sales.” It should also be noted that other professions (professional sports referees, 
college professors, judges, etc.) are prohibited from accepting gifts from anyone who might be influenced by their 
decisions (Minnigan & Chisholm). 
 
What Does the Theory of Gift Giving and Receiving Say?
Despite physicians’ expressed confidence that they are largely immune from the efforts of pharmaceutical 
companies to influence their prescribing behaviors in ways that would better serve the purposes of the company 
instead of those of their patients, a substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature suggests reasons why 
this confidence could be mistaken. Some of this literature focuses on the manner in which gifts (regardless of 
size) influence human behavior and the role they play in human relationships. According to Katz, Caplan & Merz 
2010, p. 13), “When a gift or gesture of any size is bestowed, it imposes on the recipient a sense of indebtedness. 
The obligation to … reciprocate, whether on a conscious or unconscious level, tends to influence behavior…”
The social rule of reciprocity imposes on the recipient a requirement to repay gifts or favors (Cialdini, 1993). In 
other words, when someone gives us something, we are expected to return the favor. Hence, the phrase “much 
obliged” is often used as a synonym for “thank you.”
The idea that the size of the gift affects the degree of influence (i.e., that large gifts would be more influential 
than small ones) seems reasonable but is not supported by social science research (Katz, Caplan & Merz 2003, 
Dana & Loewenstein). The secret of the success of the world’s record holder for car sales was to send a greeting 
card which included the phrase “I like you” to each customer each month (Cialdini p. 174). In another example, 
after a pharmacy owner gave potential customers a $0.50 key chain when they entered the store, customers’ retail 
purchases increased 17%, a statistically significant increase (Friedman & Herskovitz 1990). Finally, when the 
Disabled American Veterans organization requested donations through direct-mail, the response rate was about 
18% when no gift was included but doubled when inexpensive, customized address labels were included with 
the solicitation (Cialdini). 
Some of the most significant behavioral behavior are the simplest; i.e., food, friendship, and flattery (Wazana). A 
gift of food is an especially powerful tool in establishing a sense of social reciprocal obligation. As expressed by 
Bell (1931, p. 125-126), “Food is the key to all social intercourse.” The inclusion of food in a social interaction, in 
and of itself, increases the persuasiveness of a presentation even if the source of the food is not the source of the 
persuasive communication itself (Janis, Kaye & Kirschner 1965). Thus, it is hardly surprising that pharmaceutical 
companies spend huge sums on food: after the University of Michigan Medical Center banned the provision of 
free lunches by pharmaceutical companies, the annual cost of the free meals provided was found to be $2.5 
million (Saul 2006). In fact, DeJong et al. (2016), in a cross-sectional study of over 275,000 physicians who 
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received a single meal from a pharmaceutical company, found a significantly higher (p<0.001) rate of prescribing 
several of the company’s branded drugs instead of generic equivalents. With respect to the friendship and flattery 
components noted above, pharmaceutical representatives have been described as “the most beautiful, friendliest, 
helpful … [and] flattering group anyone meets” (Grant & Iserson, p. 533).  
Transparency
Although physicians have been shown to believe that their prescribing behavior is not affected by gifts from 
pharmaceutical companies, there is evidence that the public does not share this view. Although many patients 
recognize the widespread nature of physician-pharmaceutical company relationships, patients who recognize 
this relationship express less trust in physicians and the healthcare system itself (Grande, Shea & Armstrong 
2012). As many as 78% of patients believe that gifts significantly affect physicians’ prescribing behavior and 
therefore increase the cost of the drugs these physicians prescribe (Blake & Early 1995). Also, after learning 
about pharmaceutical companies’ gifts to physicians, nearly a quarter of patients changed their perception of the 
medical profession itself (Gibbons et al). In fact, this disapproval of physicians receiving gifts from pharmaceutical 
companies is increasing: Jastifer & Roberts (2009) reported that patients in their study were less approving of 
every type of gift to physicians than patients surveyed in the 1990s.
Many believe that increased transparency will lead to better healthcare outcomes at lower costs (Healthcare 
Financial Management Association, 2017, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2016), although not all agree (Frakt 
2001, Ubel, 2013). Regardless of the effects on costs, there is little doubt that there will be a trend to increased 
transparency in healthcare for the immediate future (Health Care Financial Management Association, 2013).
Although many physicians continue to believe that receiving gifts from pharmaceutical companies is an acceptable 
practice (Bihlmeyer, Schreiber & Farrand, Brett, Burr & Moloo, Gibbons et al, Morgan et al 2006, Purdy 2006, 
Schetky), this custom may be declining (DeLegge 2012), especially as the practice receives additional scrutiny. 
As part of the Physician Payment Sunshine Act (part of the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services has published about 16 million financial transactions totaling nearly $10 billion 
between physicians and teaching hospitals and health care industries between August 2013 and December 2014 
(Steinbrook 2016). These sorts of public records will, almost certainly, become more widely available in the 
future. As they become more and more detailed, physicians may be influenced to decrease behavior which many 
of their patients frown upon (Jastifer & Roberts).
Conclusions
Despite many physicians’ beliefs that they are immune to the influence of gifts from pharmaceutical companies, 
substantial evidence exists that this belief is incorrect, although the pharmaceutical companies argue otherwise. 
The theory of gift-giving and gift-receiving provides an understanding for the fallacy of this self-serving position 
on the part of both prescribers and pharmaceutical companies.
As healthcare transparency records become increasingly available for public view, physicians may be forced by 
public pressure to cease (or at least, decrease) their willingness to accept “gifts” from pharmaceutical companies 
and prescribe drugs in a manner less fulfilling to the interests of pharmaceutical companies and more in the 
interests of the public at large.
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Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers and Practitioners: This paper is useful in understanding the 
effects of pharmaceutical companies’ gifts to physicians and the attitudes of those physicians toward those gifts. 
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